Prawda jako wartość epistemiczna: fenomenologia oczywistości i usytuowania poznania
Abstract
Truth as an Epistemic Value: Phenomenology of Evidence and Situated Cognition
The article concerns the question of how truth is constituted as truth. The author describes epistemic relation as the noetic-noematic one, where truth is a correlate of evidence. So, Evidence is regarded as a first-person access to truth as such. The article differentiates strict, and moderate notions of evidence, and points out that the latter is adequate for describing common cognition. In result, the author describes truth as constituted by situated evidence, and he claims that this epistemic structure refers to occasional truths, and everyday epistemic situations.
Keywords: truth, epistemic value, evidence, situated cognition, Husserl.
The article concerns the question of how truth is constituted as truth. The author describes epistemic relation as the noetic-noematic one, where truth is a correlate of evidence. So, Evidence is regarded as a first-person access to truth as such. The article differentiates strict, and moderate notions of evidence, and points out that the latter is adequate for describing common cognition. In result, the author describes truth as constituted by situated evidence, and he claims that this epistemic structure refers to occasional truths, and everyday epistemic situations.
Keywords: truth, epistemic value, evidence, situated cognition, Husserl.
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