Kuszenie i wolna wola. O pewnym rozwiązaniu problemu natury relacji między ludzką wolnością a wszechwiedzą Boga

Stanisław Judycki


Temptation and Free Will. A Solution to the Problem of the Relationship Between Human Free Will and God’s Omniscience

The article aims to show that none of the today discussed positions concerning the relationship between human free will and God’s omniscience—determinism, compatibilism, molinism and libertarianian revisionism—is an adequate solution and proposes a position to some extent resembling Kant’s solution to his Third Antinomy, where he made the distinction between subject as causa phenomenon and subject as causanoumenon. God possesses not only an absolute knowledge concerning all processes and events in the world, but He also has a full knowledge concerning what all human subjects will decide to do. Nevertheless, His absolute knowledge in this sense is compatible with human freedom, because ‘real freedom’ is ‘located’—as a causality of freedom—in individual human natures which already exist in eternity and of which our actual inner experience gives us only a ‘sensual scheme’ (Kant). Human persons are tempted by different life experiences which they receive, i.e. they are tested by God and it cannot be excluded that some of these personal essences will turn out to be only illusory and in this sense will be condemned. For all other persons worldly experience was planned by God as a necessary element of their future eternal life.

Keywords:God, omniscience, freedom, determinism, eternal life, persons.

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